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Abstract
We consider zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, where the
states privately observed by each player follow independent Markov chains. It generalizes the
model, introduced by Aumann and Maschler in the sixties and solved by Mertens and Zamir
in the seventies, where the private states of the players were fixed. It also includes the model
introduced in Renault [20], of Markov chain repeated games with lack of information on one
side, where only one player privately observes the sequence of states. We prove here that the
limit value exists, and we obtain a characterization via the Mertens-Zamir system, where the
“non revealing value function” plugged in the system is now defined as the limit value of an
auxiliary “non revealing” dynamic game. This non revealing game is defined by restricting
the players not to reveal any information on the limit behavior of their own Markov chain, as
in Renault 2006. There are two key technical difficulties in the proof: 1) proving regularity, in
the sense of equicontinuity, of the T -stage non revealing value functions, and 2) constructing
strategies by blocks in order to link the values of the non revealing games with the original
values.
Key words: repeated games; incomplete information; zero-sum games; Markov chain; lack of
information on both sides; stochastic games; Mertens-Zamir system.
1 Introduction
The pioneering work of Aumann and Maschler in the 1960s introducing Repeated games with
incomplete information (see [1] for a re-edition of their work) was widely studied and extended.
One of their most famous results concerns the model of two-player zero-sum repeated game
with lack of information on one side and perfect observation: At the beginning of the game, a
state variable k is chosen at random in a finite set K using some probability p, and announced
to Player 1 only. A finite zero-sum game Gk depending on the state variable is then played
repeatedly and after each stage the actions played are observed by both players. The famous
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cavu theorem of Aumann and Maschler then reads as follows: the value of the infinitely
repeated game exists and is characterized as the concave hull of the value of an auxiliary game
called the non-revealing game. In a previous work of Renault [20], this model was extended
in the following direction: instead of being fixed once for all at the beginning of the game,
the state variable was assumed to evolve according to a Markov chain of initial probability
p and transition matrix M over K. Renault proved that in this model, called Markov chain
game with incomplete information on one side, the value of the infinitely repeated game exists
and gave a characterization for it, very close to the one of Aumann and Maschler. The main
difference was in the definition of the non-revealing game: it was defined in Renault [20]
as a dynamic game with infinite length where Player 1 was constrained not to reveal any
information on the asymptotic behavior of the Markov chain rather than on the current state
variable itself. The model of Markov chain game with incomplete information on one side was
also studied by Neyman [17] who proved the existence of an optimal strategy for Player 1 and
also proved a generalization of the existence of the value in case of imperfect observation of
actions.
A more involved model also introduced in [1] is the model of two-player zero-sum repeated
game with lack of information on both sides and perfect observation: At the beginning of the
game, two states of nature k and l are chosen independently in some finite sets K and L,
according to some probabilities p and q. The state k is announced to Player 1 only, and the
state l is announced to Player 2 only. These states of nature determine a finite zero-sum game
Gk,l which is then played repeatedly; after each stage the actions played are observed by both
players. Aumann and Maschler showed that the infinitely repeated game may have no value.
Mertens and Zamir [16], showed the existence of the limit value (i.e. the existence of a limit
for the sequence of values of finitely repeated games when the number of repetitions goes to
infinity) in this model and gave a characterization for it (see the system (1) later) based on a
system of functional equations acting on the value of the non-revealing game.
The results of Aumann and Maschler and of Mertens and Zamir led to a great number
of works dedicated to generalizations of this model, or close extensions of it. Let us cite for
games with incomplete information on one side, Kohlberg [11] for an explicit construction of
an optimal strategy for Player 2, De Meyer and Rosenberg [5] and Laraki [14] for alternative
proofs of existence of the limit value based on duality, Gensbittel [6] for the extension to
infinite action spaces, or Sorin [26], Hart [8], Simon et al. [23], Renault [18] [19] for the
nonzero-sum case.
Concerning incomplete information on both sides, let us mention the proof of existence of
asymptotically optimal strategies by Heuer [9], the extension of the Mertens-Zamir system by
Sorin [27], the study of an abstract game called the splitting game related to the system of
functional equations by Laraki [15], alternative proofs of existence of the limit value based on
the so-called operator approach by Rosenberg and Sorin [22], or more recently on continuous-
time approach by Cardaliaguet, Laraki and Sorin [3].
We only consider here two-player zero-sum games and generalize the model of repeated
game with lack of information on both sides to the case where the states of nature (k, l) are no
longer fixed at the beginning of the game, but evolve according to given independent Markov
chains (kt)t≥1 and (lt)t≥1. At the beginning of each stage, kt is observed by Player 1 only,
and lt is observed by Player 2 only. We call such games Markov chain games with lack of
information on both sides. Note that this model admits as a special case the model of repeated
game with incomplete information on both sides, in which the value of the infinitely repeated
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game may not exist. In this paper, we generalize both the proofs of Renault [20] and Mertens
and Zamir [16] and show the existence of the limit value for Markov chain games with lack
of information on both sides. We also give a characterization for this limit value based on a
system of functional equations, similar to the one introduced by Mertens and Zamir, and on
the generalized notion of non-revealing games as introduced by Renault.
However, as already mentioned in these two works, our expression of the value cannot
be easily computed from the basic data of the game. It was already noticed in [16], where
several examples of computations are given, underlying that the limit value may be outside
of the class of semi-algebraic functions, which contrasts with properties of the limit value for
stochastic games (with complete information and finite state and action spaces). Moreover,
the problem of computation of the value of non-revealing games for Markov chain games
with incomplete information on one side was already mentioned by Renault who gave an
example which appeared to be very difficult to compute, except for very particular values of
the transition matrix as shown in the work of Ho¨rner et al. [10].
Section 2 of this paper contains the model. Section 3 contains preliminary results and
notations. A few important examples, and the main ideas of the proof, are presented in section
4. In section 5, we define and study a notion of nonrevealing strategies via projection matrices
that will be used to quantify a notion of relevant information for both players. We introduce
the auxiliary games called nonrevealing games, where both players are restricted to play a
nonrevealing strategy, and prove that they have a limit value. In section 6, we study some
properties of the system of functional equations introduced by Mertens and Zamir associated
to the limit value of the non-revealing game. Our main result theorem 2.2 will imply that the
limit value is the unique solution of this system. Section 7 contains a list of open questions
related to the possible extensions of the model. Section 8 is an appendix containing the main
proofs and some technical results.
2 Model
Given a finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of probabilities over S and the cardinal of S is,
with a slight abuse of notations, also denoted by S. The set of positive integers is denoted
IN∗.
We consider a zero-sum game between 2 players with action sets I and J , sets of states
K and L, where I, J , K, L are disjoint finite non empty sets, and payoff function
g : K × L× I × J −→ [−1, 1].
M and N are given Markov matrices on K and L respectively, i.e. M = (Mk,k′)k,k′∈K is a
K ×K matrix with non-negative entries and such that for all k ∈ K, ∑k′∈K Mk,k′ = 1, and
similarly for N . The letters p ∈ ∆(K) and q ∈ ∆(L) denote initial probabilities.
The game is played by stages in discrete time. We are given two independent Markov
chains: (kt)t≥1 with initial distribution p and transition matrix M , and (lt)t≥1 with initial
distribution q and transition matrix N . At the beginning of every stage t ≥ 1, Player 1
observes kt and Player 2 observes lt. Then both players simultaneously select an action in
their action set, if (it, jt) in I × J is played then Player 1’s payoff for stage t is g(kt, lt, it, jt).
Then (it, jt) is publicly observed and the play goes to stage t + 1. Notice that the payoff
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g(kt, lt, it, jt) is not directly observed and may not be deduced by the players at the end of
stage t.
We denote by Σ and T the sets of behavior strategies of the players. Formally, for t ≥ 1,
let Ht = (I × J)t denote the set of histories of actions of length t, with the convention
H0 = {∅}. A strategy σ ∈ Σ is a sequence (σt)t≥1, where σt is a map from Ht−1 × Kt to
∆(I). For T ∈ IN∗, the set ΣT denotes the set of T -stage strategies for Player 1, that is of
finite sequences (σ1, .., σT ) induced by elements of Σ. T and TT are defined similarly.
The value of the T -stage game is denoted vT (p, q), i.e.
vT (p, q) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γp,qT (σ, τ) = minτ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γp,qT (σ, τ),
where γp,qT (σ, τ) = IEp,q,σ,τ [
1
T
∑T
t=1 g(kt, lt, it, jt)], the expectation being taken with respect to
the probability IPp,q,σ,τ induced by (p, q, σ, τ) on the set of plays Ω = (K × L × I × J)∞.
Elements of ∆(K) are seen as row vectors, so that if p′ in ∆(K) is the law of the state kT of
stage T , then p′M is the law of the following state kT+1 (similarly elements of ∆(L) are seen
as row vectors). We have the standard recursive formula, for all T ≥ 0:
(T + 1)vT+1(p, q) = max
x∈∆(I)K
min
y∈∆(J)L

G(p, q, x, y) + T ∑
i∈I,j∈J
x(p)(i)y(q)(j)vT (~p(x, i)M,~q(y, j)N)


= min
y∈∆(J)L
max
x∈∆(I)K

G(p, q, x, y) + T ∑
i∈I,j∈J
x(p)(i)y(q)(j)vT (~p(x, i)M,~q(y, j)N)

 .
where G(p, q, x, y) =
∑
k,l,i,j p
kqlxk(i)yl(j)g(k, l, i, j),
∀i ∈ I, x(p)(i) =
∑
k
pkxk(i), and ~p(x, i) =
(
pkxk(i)
x(p)(i)
)
k∈K
∈ ∆(K) if x(p)(i) > 0,
∀j ∈ J, y(q)(j) =
∑
l
qlyl(j), and ~q(y, j) =
(
qlyl(j)
y(q)(j)
)
l∈L
∈ ∆(L) if y(q)(j) > 0,
and ~p(x, i) (resp. ~q(y, j)) is defined arbitrarily if x(p)(i) = 0 (resp. y(q)(j) = 0). If at some
stage t the belief of Player 2 on the current state kt in K is represented by p, and if Player 1
plays the mixed action xk if his current state is k, then x(p)(i) will be the probability that a
given action i in I is played at this stage. After observing i, ~p(x, i) represents the new belief
of Player 2 on kt, and ~p(x, i)M is the belief of Player 2 on kt+1.
We will extensively use the following definitions. If f is a real function on ∆(K)×∆(L),
we say that f is I-concave, resp. II-convex, if it is concave in the first variable, resp. convex
in the second variable. cavIf and vexIIf denote respectively the smallest I-concave function
above f and the largest II-convex function below f .
Definition 2.1. C denotes the set of continuous functions from ∆(K)×∆(L) to [−1, 1]. For
each f in C, we introduce:
C+(f) = {w ∈ C, w is I-concave and ∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), w(p, q) ≥ vexIIMax(w, f)(p, q)} ,
C−(f) = {w ∈ C, w is II-convex and ∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), w(p, q) ≤ cavIMin(w, f)(p, q)} .
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The main result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 2.2. v(p, q) = limT→∞vT (p, q) exists.
Moreover, if the Markov chains on K and L are recurrent and aperiodic, we will define
a “nonrevealing limit value” function vˆ (see Proposition 5.16), and will prove that v is the
unique solution of the Mertens-Zamir system associated to vˆ, that is:
∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L),
{
w(p, q) = vexIIMax(w, vˆ)(p, q)
w(p, q) = cavIMin(w, vˆ)(p, q)
, (1)
or, equivalently, that v = inf{w ∈ C+(vˆ)} = sup{w ∈ C−(vˆ)}.
Note that this characterization is helpful only when one of the chains has several recurrence
classes, i.e. when there is incomplete information on the asymptotic behavior of the chains.
Indeed, in the case of irreducible chains, our definition of vˆ implies that v(p, q) = vˆ(p, q) and
it is easy to show that these functions do not depend on (p, q) (see example C in the next
section), so that the above system do not bring any information.
3 Preliminaries
In all the paper the sets ∆(K), ∆(L) and ∆(K)×∆(L) are endowed with the L1-norm. The
following properties of the value functions are standard. For each T ≥ 1, vT is I-concave,
II-convex and 1-Lipschitz. And for all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), we have: |vT+1(p, q)−vT (p, q)| ≤
2
T , |vT+1(p, q)− vT (pM, qN)| ≤ 2T , and consequently |vT (p, q)− vT (pM, qN)| ≤ 4T .
If some state k is transient, then for each ε there exists T0 such that IP (∀T ≥ T0, kT 6=
k) ≥ 1 − ε. Both players can wait until stage T0 and enter a game where state k has disap-
peared with high probability, so to prove theorem 2.2 we can assume w.l.o.g. that there is no
transient state. In the sequel, we assume that all states in K and L are recurrent.
We now take care of periodicity. Some states may a priori be periodic, let T0 be a common
multiple of all periods in the chains induced byM and N . From the above properties, we have
lim supT vTT0(p, q) = lim supT vT (p, q), and lim infT vTT0(p, q) = lim infT vT (p, q), so to study
limT vT we can consider plays by blocks of T0 stages (so that one stage now corresponds to
T0 original stages). The Markov chains with transitions matrices M
T0 and NT0 are aperiodic,
and this consideration is without loss of generality.
Summing up, from now on1 we assume w.l.o.g. that both Markov chains are recurrent
and aperiodic. We still use the letters M and N to denote the (now recurrent aperiodic)
transitions matrices. We have the convergence of M t to a stochastic matrix B such that
B2 = B = BM = MB. The state space K can be partitioned into recurrence classes K(1),
..., K(rM ), where rM is the number of recurrence classes associated to M . Each class K(r)
has a unique invariant measure p∗(r), and the k-th row of B corresponds to p∗(r) where K(r)
1except in the example E of the next section and in Remark 6.2
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is the class containing k. Invariant measures for B and M coincide, the set of those measures
is the convex hull of {p∗(1), ..., p∗(rM )} denoted by P ∗. Although B is not invertible if there
are less recurrence classes than states, for p∗ in P ∗ we write B−1(p∗) = {p ∈ ∆(K), pB = p∗}.
Regarding the Markov chain associated to the states in L, we proceed similarly and use
the following notations. There is convergence of N t to a stochastic matrix C. The state space
L is partitioned into recurrence classes L(1), ..., L(rL). Each class L(r) has a unique invariant
measure q∗(r), and the l-th row of C corresponds to q∗(r) where L(r) is the class containing
l. Invariant measures for C and N coincide, the set of those measures is the convex hull of
{q∗(1), ..., q∗(rL)} denoted by Q∗. For q∗ in Q∗, we write C−1(q∗) = {q ∈ ∆(K), qC = q∗}.
We now provide an example to illustrate some of our notations.
Example A:K = L = {a, b, c}, andM = N =

23 13 01
3
2
3 0
0 0 1

 . There are two recurrence classes
K(1) = {a, b} and K(2) = {c}. The associated invariant measures are p∗(1) = (12 , 12 , 0) and
p∗(2) = (0, 0, 1), and the limit projection matrix is B =

12 12 01
2
1
2 0
0 0 1

 .
c
a b
p
P*
B-1(pB)
pB
p*(2)
p*(1)
We will use the following notion in the proofs.
Definition 3.1. f is balanced if for all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), f(p, q) = f(pM, qN).
Since the Markov chains are recurrent aperiodic, f is balanced if and only if f is constant
on the recurrence classes of the chains.
4 Examples and overview of the proof
Let us at first emphasize that, in contrast with repeated games with incomplete information,
if Player 1 does not use his information on the states (kt)t≥1, beliefs of Player 2 over states
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evolve across stages according to the transition matrix M . Precisely, under this assumption,
the belief of Player 2 on the current state kt+1 at stage t+1 (i.e., the conditional law of kt+1
given the actions played up to stage t) is simply the law of kt+1, which is pM
t. Symmetrically,
if Player 2 does not use his information on the states (lt)t≥1, then the belief of Player 1 on
lt+1 at stage t+ 1 is qN
t.
Example B: A Markov chain without memory. If both Markov chains are i.i.d. se-
quences, then the problem reduces to a classical repeated game, by replacing the payoff func-
tion in pure strategies by its expectation with respect to (kt, lt). The value of the infinitely
repeated game exists and equals the value of this auxiliary one-stage game.
Example C: Irreducible aperiodic Markov chains. Assume that both chains are irre-
ducible and aperiodic, say K = L = {a, b}, M =
(
2
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
)
and N =
(
3
4
1
4
1 0
)
. This Markov
chain has a unique recurrence class, so rM = rN = 1 and K = K(1) = L = L(1). Unique
invariant probabilities are p∗ = (12 ,
1
2) and q
∗ = (45 ,
1
5 ). M
t and N t respectively converge to:
B =
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
and C =
(
4
5
1
5
4
5
1
5
)
. In this case, the limit value exists, and we even have the
stronger result that the (uniform) value of the infinitely repeated game exists. At first, if
Player 1 plays independently of the states, the beliefs of Player 2 converge to p∗. On the
other hand, after any sufficiently long number of stages, he can always forget the past actions
of Player 2 and act as if his beliefs were very close to q∗. Choose now some integer T0 such
that MT0 and NT0 are respectively close to B and C, and then T1 much larger than T0. Let
us construct a strategy of Player 1 as follows: (1) play any strategy independent of the states
during T0 stages, then (2) play an optimal strategy in the game ΓT1(p
∗, q∗), and (3) come
back to (1). Such a strategy guarantees to Player 1 vT1(p
∗, q∗) up to some arbitrarily small
error, hence by choosing T1 large enough Player 1 guarantees limsupT vT (p
∗, q∗) in the in-
finitely repeated game. Inverting the role of the players implies that the value of the infinitely
repeated game exists and equals limT vT (p
∗, q∗). In particular it does not depend on the initial
probabilities (p, q). Notice that this proof can be generalized to the case of any irreducible
aperiodic Markov chain.
Example D: M and L are the identity matrix. In this case, the problem is a repeated
game with incomplete information on both sides as studied by Mertens and Zamir [16] since
the initial state is selected at the beginning of the game and remains constant. In terms of
Markov chains, the states2 can be here identified with the recurrence classes, and therefore any
information on the states is an information on the asymptotic behavior of the corresponding
chain.
Let us at first define the non-revealing game: it denotes the game where none of the players
is allowed to use his information on the state variable (i.e. players are restricted to use strate-
gies which do not depend on the selected states). For each pair (p, q) of initial probabilities,
this game can be analyzed as the repetition of the average matrix game
∑
k,l p
kqlg(k, l, ., .).
Consequently, its value is just the value u(p, q) = maxx∈∆(I)miny∈∆(J)
∑
k,l p
kqlg(k, l, x(i), y(j))
of the one-stage average game.
2also called types in games with incomplete information
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Theorem 4.1 ([16]). For each f in C, there exists a unique solution in C to the system:
∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L),
{
w = vexIIMax(w, f)
w = cavIMin(w, f)
, (2)
This solution is denoted MZ(f) and MZ(f) = sup{w|w ∈ C−(f)} = inf{w|w ∈ C+(f)}.
Back to games, Mertens and Zamir proved that in the case of example D, the limit value
v exists and is MZ(u). Assuming the equality sup{w|w ∈ C−(u)} = inf{w|w ∈ C+(u)},
their proof of convergence of (vT ) can be sketched as follows. The main point is to show
that for any function w in C−(u), Player 1 can defend in the game of length T with initial
probabilities p and q, the quantity w(p, q) up to an error going to zero with T uniformly
with respect to (p, q) and the chosen strategy of Player 2. This can be done as follows. The
strategy of Player 2 being known, Player 1 can compute after each stage t the current pair of
beliefs (pt, qt) of both players: pt denotes the conditional law of kt+1 given past actions and
qt denotes the conditional law of lt+1 given past actions. Then, either u(pt, qt) ≥ w(pt, qt)
and he plays an optimal strategy in the non-revealing game at (pt, qt), or u(pt, qt) < w(pt, qt)
and he can split his information (think of Player 1 sending a, possibly random, message to
Player 2) in order to drive Player 2’s beliefs at some points p˜t such that u(p˜t, qt) ≥ w(p˜t, qt).
The existence of such a splitting is ensured by: 1) the property w ∈ C−(u) and 2) the split-
ting Lemma (see e.g. the Lemmas 8.12 and 8.13 in the present work). This strategy would
defend w(pt, qt) at stage t+ 1 if Player 2 was not using his information on the state at stage
t + 1. This is almost the case since the error can be bounded by the expected L1-variation
of the beliefs ‖qt+1 − qt‖. Recall that the sequence of beliefs (qt) is a martingale and a clas-
sical bound on its L1 variation allows to bound uniformly the average error by a quantity
vanishing with T . Moreover using the properties of w and the construction of the strategy
of Player 1, the expected value of w(pt, qt) is always greater or equal than w(p, q). All this
implies that liminfnvn(p, q) ≥ w(p, q), so we obtain liminfnvn ≥ sup{w|w ∈ C−(u)}. Inverting
the role of the players, we also have limsupnvn ≤ inf{w|w ∈ C+(u)} which concludes the proof.
Example E: A periodic chain Let K be {a, b}, and M be
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
This Markov chain has a unique recurrence class, which is periodic with period 2. The
relevant information for Player 2 is not the recurrence class, but the initial state which de-
termines whether the sequence of states (kt)t≥1 will be {a, b, a, b, ...} or {b, a, b, a, ...}. By
considering the auxiliary game in which stages are blocks of length 2 of the initial game, then
the new transition matrix is M2, hence the identity, and each initial state becomes now a
recurrence class. The problem can be reduced to that of Example D. As explained in section
3, this idea of playing stages by blocks of fixed length can be used in the general case to
assume without loss of generality that the chain is aperiodic.
Back to Example A, the existence of the limit value in this case appears to be more difficult,
and we do not know how to proceed without following the general proof presented in this pa-
per. Following the general scheme of Renault [20], we will consider two kinds of information:
long-term information (corresponding to the recurrence classes of the two chains, as in the
Mertens-Zamir case), and short-term information (corresponding to the state variable itself
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within some recurrence class).
We now come back to the general case, assuming the Markov chains are recurrent and
aperiodic, and describe the different steps of our proof.
Overview of the Proof
By analogy with the proof in Renault [20], we define a non-revealing game, where Players are
restricted to strategies that do not reveal information on the recurrence classes of the chains.
Precisely, the strategy of Player 1 has to be such that, after each history of actions of length t,
the conditional probability that kt+1 belongs to any recurrence class K(r) remains unchanged
(see Definition 5.3).
This conceptual definition has to be compared with the non-revealing strategies introduced
by Aumann and Maschler in case each player observes after each stage a signal which is a
function of the actions played, and which requires that the beliefs of Player 2 on the state k
remains unchanged.
The main difference here is that the study of the non-revealing game can not be reduced
to that of a finite matrix game. Following the scheme of the proof of example C, with
appropriate modifications, we show that the limit value vˆ of this non-revealing game exists
and that it depends only on the limit distributions of the two Markov chains (pB, qC). This
proof requires however a precise analysis of the T -stage non-revealing games, for which we
prove the existence of the value vˆT and an appropriate recursive formula. The crucial point
of the analysis of the non revealing values is to establish that the family (vˆT )T≥1 is uniformly
equi-continuous (this is the aim of the whole section 8.1), which implies uniform convergence
of these values to their limit.
The second main technical difficulty is to link the values of the non revealing games with
those of the original game, i.e. to adapt the proof of Mertens and Zamir illustrated in example
D. We use the uniform convergence mentioned above, in particular for sufficiently large T0,
vˆT0 is ε-close to vˆ. We prove that for any n ∈ IN∗, and for any balanced function w ∈ C−(vˆ),
Player 1 can defend w(p, q) in ΓnT0(p, q) up to some error going to zero with n uniformly
with respect to (p, q) and the chosen strategy of Player 2. The construction of the strategy
of Player 1 is the same as explained in example D, except that stages are replaced by blocks
of T0 stages: Player 1 can compute after each block the current pair of beliefs (pnT0 , qnT0)
of both players and either (1) vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) ≥ w(pnT0 , qnT0) and he plays an optimal strategy
in the non-revealing game of length T0 at (pnT0 , qnT0), or (2) vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) < w(pnT0 , qnT0),
and he can send a random message to Player 2 in order to drive his beliefs at some points
p˜nT0 such that vˆ(p˜nT0 , qnT0) ≥ w(p˜nT0 , qnT0) and there he plays as in case (1). This strategy
would defend w(pnT0 , qnT0) up to an error of ε on the n-th block of size T0 if Player 2 was not
using his information on the recurrence classes of the chain (lt)t on this block. In order to
bound the error due to this approximation, we have to replace the error term based on the
L1-variation of the process (qt)t≥1 (which is no more a martingale here) by the L1-variation
of an auxiliary martingale representing the beliefs of Player 1 over the recurrence classes of
the Markov chain (lt)t≥1 (note however that we obtain a less precise bound since the method
developed for games with incomplete information does not apply here). Then, we prove that
the expected value of w(pnT0 , qnT0) is always greater or equal to w(p, q) using similar tools as
in [16] and also that w is balanced. We obtain liminfnvn ≥ sup{w|w ∈ C−(vˆ),balanced}, and
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by symmetry limsupnvn ≤ inf{w|w ∈ C+(vˆ),balanced}.
Then it remains to show the equality
sup{w|w ∈ C−(vˆ),balanced} = inf{w|w ∈ C+(vˆ),balanced},
by reducing the problem to the equality showed by Mertens and Zamir. The convergence of
(vn)n follows, and it is not difficult to see that the limit is MZ(vˆ).
5 Non revealing games
Let σ in Σ be a strategy of Player 1, i.e. σ = (σT )T≥1, with σT : (K×I×J)T−1×K −→ ∆(I)
for all T . For each finite history hT in (I×J)T , we say that hT is compatible with (p, σ) if for
some τ and q we have IPp,q,σ,τ (hT ) > 0. In this case we define pT (p, σ)(hT ) in ∆(K) as the law
of the state kT+1 knowing that: the initial state k1 is selected according to p, Player 1 uses σ
and hT has been played at the first T stages. It does not depend on the last move of Player
2 in hT , and for all k in K, q in ∆(L) and strategy τ of Player 2 such that IPp,q,σ,τ (hT ) > 0,
we have:
pkT (p, σ)(hT ) = IPp,q,σ,τ (kT+1 = k|hT ).
If hT is not compatible with (p, σ), we define pT (p, σ)(hT ) arbitrarily in ∆(K). For T = 0,
p0(p, σ) = p is the law of the first state k1.
Definition 5.1. We define pˆT (p, σ)(hT ) = pT (p, σ)(hT )B, and we call pˆT (p, σ)(hT ) the rele-
vant information of Player 2 after hT has been played.
pˆT (p, σ)(hT ) indicates the belief on the asymptotic distribution of the Markov chain (kt)
after hT has been played, if the initial probability is p and player 1 uses σ.
For each T , we denote by HT the σ-algebra on the set of plays Ω generated by the
projection on (I × J)T giving the first T moves.
Lemma 5.2. For any strategy pair (σ, τ) in Σ× T , the process (pˆT (p, σ))T≥0 is a (HT )T≥0-
martingale with respect to IPp,q,σ,τ .
Proof: Assume (σ, τ) is played, the initial probabilities on ∆(K) and ∆(L) being p and
q. Fix T ≥ 0 and hT = (i1, j1, ..., iT , jT ) ∈ (I × J)T . Given (iT+1, jT+1) in I × J , we
write hT+1 = (i1, ..., jT , iT+1, jT+1) and denote by rT (p, σ)(hT+1) the conditional probability
on the state kT+1 given that hT+1 has been played at the first T + 1 stages. We have
rT (p, σ)(hT+1)M = pT+1(p, σ)(hT+1), and IEp,q,σ,τ (rT (p, σ)|hT ) = pT (p, σ)(hT ). Now,
IEp,q,σ,τ (pˆT+1(p, σ)|hT ) = IEp,q,σ,τ (pT+1(p, σ)B|hT )
= IEp,q,σ,τ (rT (p, σ)MB|hT )
= IEp,q,σ,τ (rT (p, σ)B|hT )
= pT (p, σ)(hT )B
= pˆT (p, σ)(hT ).
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Definition 5.3. A strategy σ in Σ is called non revealing at p if for all τ and q, the martingale
(pˆT (p, σ))T≥0 is IPp,q,σ,τ -almost surely constant. The set of NR strategies of Player 1 at p is
denoted Σˆ(p).
We will give an alternative definition of non revealing strategies.
Definition 5.4.
NR(p) = {x ∈ ∆(I)K ,∀i ∈ I s.t. x(p)(i) > 0, ~p(x, i)B = pB}
= {x ∈ ∆(I)K ,∀i ∈ I, (pkxk(i))k∈KB = x(p)(i) pB}.
Given σ in Σ and an history hT ∈ (I×J)T which is compatible with (p, σ), for each i in I
and k in K, we denote by xk(p, σ)(hT )(i) the probability IPp,q,σ,τ (iT+1 = i|kT+1 = k, hT ) that
Player 1 plays i after hT if the next state is k. This probability does not depend on (q, τ).
The vector x(p, σ)(hT ) = (x
k(p, σ)(hT )(i))k,i is viewed as en element of ∆(I)
K . The proof of
the next lemma is similar to the proof of Proposition 6.5 in [20] and is omitted here.
Lemma 5.5. A strategy σ in Σ is non revealing at p if and only if for all T ≥ 0 and history
hT ∈ (I × J)T compatible with (p, σ), the vector x(p, σ)(hT ) belongs to NR(pT (p, σ)(hT )).
We also have a splitting lemma with non revealing strategies.
Lemma 5.6. Consider a convex combination p =
∑
s∈S αsps in ∆(K) having the property
that psB = pB for all s. Consider for each s a non revealing strategy σs in Σˆ(ps). There
exists σ in Σˆ(p) such that:
∀q ∈ ∆(L),∀τ ∈ T , IPp,q,σ,τ =
∑
s∈S
αsIPps,q,σs,τ .
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.6 in [20], with σ being defined via the
splitting procedure: observe the first state k1 in K, then choose s according to the probability
αsp
k1
s /p
k1 , and play according to σs.
Non revealing strategies of Player 2 at q are defined similarly, the set of such strategies is
denoted Tˆ (q).
Definition 5.7. The T -stage non revealing game at (p, q) is the T -stage game where the
strategy sets are restricted to Σˆ(p) and Tˆ (q). It is denoted by ΓˆT (p, q).
Define ΣˆT (p) as the set of T -stage non revealing strategies of Player 1 at p. Formally,
ΣˆT (p) is the projection of Σˆ(p) over the (compact) set of T -stage strategies of Player 1.
Similarly, TˆT (q) denotes the set of T -stage non revealing strategies of Player 2 at q. The game
ΓˆT (p, q) can equivalently be seen as the zero-sum game (ΣˆT (p), TˆT (q), γp,qT ). The proof of the
next proposition is standard and similar to the proofs of proposition 7.3 and 7.4 in [20].
Proposition 5.8. For all T ≥ 1, the T -stage non revealing game at (p, q) has a value denoted
by vˆT (p, q). For each q in ∆(L) and p
∗ in P ∗, (p 7→ vˆT (p, q)) is concave on B−1(p∗), and
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similarly for each p in ∆(K) and q∗ in Q∗, (q 7→ vˆT (p, q)) is convex on C−1(q∗). Moreover,
for all T ≥ 0 we have the recursive formula:
(T + 1)vˆT+1(p, q) = max
x∈NR(p)
min
y∈NR(q)

G(p, q, x, y) + T ∑
i∈I,j∈J
x(p)(i)y(q)(j)vˆT (~p(x, i)M,~q(y, j)N)


= min
y∈NR(q)
max
x∈NR(p)

G(p, q, x, y) + T ∑
i∈I,j∈J
x(p)(i)y(q)(j)vˆT (~p(x, i)M,~q(y, j)N)

 .
We now show that to play optimally, Player 2 does not need to remember the whole se-
quence of states (l1, ..., lt, ...). This will allow us to consider a smaller set of strategies.
Definition 5.9. Let T denote the subset of strategies of Player 2 which for all T ≥ 0, depend
at stage T + 1 only on the past history hT ∈ (I × J)T and on the current state lT+1. Define
Σ similarly.
Proposition 5.10. For all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), for all τ ∈ T , there exists a strategy τ ∈ T
such that for all T ≥ 1 and σ ∈ Σ, γp,qT (σ, τ) = γp,qT (σ, τ ). Moreover, if τ is non-revealing at
q, then τ is also non-revealing at q. As a corollary, in ΓT (p, q) and in the non revealing game
ΓˆT (p, q) the players have optimal strategies in Σ and T .
Proof: The strategy τ proceeds as follows: for t ≥ 0, at stage t+1, Player 2 does not remind
the past states (l1, .., lt), but using the history ht, he can generate a virtual sequence (l1, .., lt)
using the conditional law of (l1, .., lt) given (ht, lt+1) under IPp,q,σ,τ (which does not depend
on σ). He selects then at stage t + 1 an action jt+1 with the probability τ(ht, l1, .., lt, lt+1).
Formally, we have τ(ht)(lt+1) = IEp,q,σ,τ [τ(ht, l1, ..., lt, lt+1)|ht, lt+1].
We will prove that for all t ≥ 1, (ht, lt, kt) has the same distribution under IPp,q,σ,τ and
under IPp,q,σ,τ , i.e. for all h ∈ Ht, for all (k, l) ∈ K × L,
IPp,q,σ,τ (ht = h, lt = l, kt = k) = IPp,q,σ,τ (ht = h, lt = l, kt = k). (3)
Let us proceed by induction on t. The property is obvious for t = 1, assume it is true for some
t ≥ 1. At first, the conditional distribution of lt+1 given (ht, kt, lt) is M(lt, .) under IPp,q,σ,τ
and under IPp,q,σ,τ . We deduce that the law of (ht, lt+1) is the same under both probabilities.
By construction the conditional law of jt+1 given (ht, lt+1) is the same under IPp,q,σ,τ and
under IPp,q,σ,τ , which implies that the conditional law of (lt+1, jt+1) given ht is also the same.
Using that (kt+1, it+1) and (lt+1, jt+1) are conditionally independent given ht (under both
distributions) and that the conditional law of (kt+1, it+1) given ht does not depend on τ ,
the conditional distribution of (kt+1, lt+1,, it+1, jt+1) given ht is the same under IPp,q,σ,τ and
under IPp,q,σ,τ . We deduce that the law of (ht+1, kt+1, lt+1) is the same under both probability
distributions which concludes the proof of (3). Going back to the main proof, we obtain
γp,qT (σ, τ) =
T−1∑
t=0
IEp,q,σ,τ [IEp,q,σ,τ [g(kt+1, lt+1, it+1, jt+1)|ht]]
=
T−1∑
t=0
IEp,q,σ,τ [IEp,q,σ,τ [g(kt+1, lt+1, it+1, jt+1)|ht]] = γp,qT (σ, τ )
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Moreover, since we proved that the law of (ht, lt+1) is the same under IPp,q,σ,τ and under
IPp,q,σ,τ , this implies that qt(q, τ) and qt(q, τ ) also have the same law, which proves the last
assertion. 2
Remark 5.11. Note that in the above construction, the laws IPp,q,σ,τ and IPp,q,σ,τ do not
coincide on the whole set Ω but generate the same payoffs. The reader may convince himself
by considering the following example:
L = {1, 2}, N =
(
1
3
2
3
2
3
1
3
)
, q = (
1
2
,
1
2
), J = {1, 2},
and τ is defined by: play 1 at stage 1 and then at stage t ≥ 2, play 1 if lt = lt−1 and 2
otherwise. A direct computation leads to
IPp,q,σ,τ (l1 = l2 = 1, j2 = 1) =
1
6
, IPp,q,σ,τ (l1 = l2 = 1, j2 = 1) =
1
18
.
The next proposition is a major point of our proof.
Proposition 5.12. For all T ≥ 1, vˆT is 3-Lipschitz on ∆(K)×∆(L).
The proof of Proposition 5.12 is postponed to the Appendix. The crucial consequence
is to obtain uniform equi-continuity of the family of functions (vˆT )T≥1. In Renault [20], the
functions (vˆT )T≥1 were only proved to be u.s.c. and this property would not have been suf-
ficient here, since the proof of our main Theorem 2.2 relies on uniform convergence of the
(vˆT )T≥1 to their limit. The main point is to introduce a function S(p, p′) (see Definition 8.2)
which will play the role of a metric and with respect to which all the functions (vˆT )T≥1 are
“non expansive”.
Before proving that the non revealing values vˆT converge when T goes to infinity, we now
present a definition and a lemma, allowing to concatenate non revealing strategies defined on
blocks.
Definition 5.13. Given T0, T1 ≥ 1 and a strategy σ ∈ Σ such that for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T1,
σT0+t does not depend on (k1, ..., kT0), we define for all hT0 ∈ HT0 a T1-stage strategy σ(hT0).
This strategy σ(hT0) plays, after a history (h
′
t−1, k
′
1, ..., k
′
t), what σ plays at stage T0 + t after
((h0, h
′
t−1), k
′
1, ..., k
′
t). Formally,
σ(hT0)t(h
′
t−1, k
′
1, ..., k
′
t) = σT0+t((hT0 , h
′
t−1), k
′
1, ..., k
′
t),∀1 ≤ t ≤ T1,∀h′t ∈ Ht−1,∀(k′1, .., k′t) ∈ Kt.
Lemma 5.14. Consider T0, T1 ∈ IN∗ and strategies (σ, τ) ∈ Σ×T such that for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T1,
σT0+t and τT0+t do not depend on, respectively, (k1, ..., kT0) and (l1, .., lT0). The conditional law
of (kT0+t, lT0+t, iT0+t, jT0+t)t=1,..,T1 given hT0 under IPp,q,σ,τ is precisely IPpT0 ,qT0 ,σ(hT0 ),τ(hT0 ).
The proof follows easily from a direct computation.
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Remark 5.15. Note that if τ ∈ T , then the above condition on τ holds for all T0, T1. We
will use the following consequences in the sequel, at first
IEp,q,σ,τ [
T1∑
t=1
g(kT0+t, lT0+t, iT0+t, jT0+t)] = IEp,q,σ,τ [γ
pT0 ,qT0
T1
(σ(hT0), τ(hT0))],
and for all t = 1, ..., T1 and any continuous function f defined on ∆(K) × ∆(L), for all
hT0 in (I × J)T0 , IEp,q,σ,τ [f(pT0+t, qT0+t)|hT0 ]=IEpT0 ,qT0 ,σ(hT0 ),τ(hT0 )[f(pt, qt)], where pT0 =
pT0(p, σ)(hT0) and qT0 = qT0(q, τ)(hT0).
Proposition 5.16. vˆ = limT→∞vˆT exists, is continuous on ∆(K)×∆(L) and is balanced.
Proof: Let (p, q) ∈ ∆(K) × ∆(L), p∗ = pB, q∗ = qC and ε > 0. Choose T0, T1 ∈ IN∗ such
that ‖MT0 −B‖ ≤ ε, ‖NT0 − C‖ ≤ ε, T0T1 ≤ ε, and vˆT1(p∗, q∗) ≥ limsupT vˆT (p∗, q∗)− ε.
Given N ∈ IN∗ and an optimal strategy τ ∈ T of Player 2 in the game ΓˆN(T0+T1)(p, q), let us
construct the strategy σ as follows. For n = 0 to N − 1, during stages t = n(T0 + T1) + 1 to
t = n(T0 + T1) + T0, play a fixed action i0 ∈ I. During the next T1 stages, play an optimal
strategy in the game ΓˆT1(pn(T0+T1)+T0(p, σ), qn(T0+T1)+T0(q, τ)). The payoff can be written as
(gm being the payoff of stage m):
N(T0 + T1)γ
p,q
N(T0+T1)
(σ, τ) =
N−1∑
n=0

 n(T0+T1)+T0∑
m=n(T0+T1)+1
IEp,q,σ,τ [gm] +
(n+1)(T0+T1)∑
m=n(T0+T1)+T0+1
IEp,q,σ,τ [gm]


≥
N−1∑
n=0
(−T0 + T1IEp,q,σ,τ [vˆT1(pn(T0+T1)+T0(p, σ), qn(T0+T1)+T0(q, τ))])
≥
N−1∑
n=0
(−T0 + T1IEp,q,σ,τ [vˆT1(pn(T0+T1)(p, σ)MT0 , qn(T0+T1)(q, τ)NT0)])
≥
N−1∑
n=0
(−T0 + T1(vˆT1(p∗, q∗)− 6ε)) .
The first inequality follows from Lemma 5.14 and the definition of σ. The second inequality
is obtained by taking conditional expectation with respect to hn(T0+T1) and using that vˆT1 is
convex with respect to the second variable on C−1(q∗). The last inequality follows directly
from the properties of T0 and the fact that vˆT1 is 3-Lipschitz. We deduce that for all N ∈ IN∗
vˆN(T0+T1)(p, q) ≥
−T0 + T1(vˆT1(p∗, q∗)− 6ε)
(T0 + T1)
≥ vˆT1(p∗, q∗)− 8ε ≥ limsupT vˆT (p∗, q∗)− 9ε.
It follows that liminfN vˆN(T0+T1)(p, q) ≥ limsupT vˆT (p∗, q∗)− 9ε. Using that ‖vˆT − vˆT+T ′‖∞ ≤
2T ′
T , this implies liminfT vˆT (p, q) ≥ limsupT vˆT (p∗, q∗). Inverting the role of K and L leads
to limsupT vˆT (p, q) ≤ liminfT vˆT (p∗, q∗), and we conclude that vˆ(p, q) = limT→∞vˆT (p, q) =
limT vˆT (p
∗, q∗) exists and is a balanced function. It is continuous because proposition 5.12
implies the uniform convergence of vˆT . 2
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6 The Mertens-Zamir system associated to the non-
revealing value
We prove here an alternative formulation for MZ(vˆ) that we will use in the proof of
theorem 2.2 outlined in section 4. Recall that we have assumed that the Markov chains on K
and L are recurrent and aperiodic. We use here the notion of balanced function.
Proposition 6.1. MZ(vˆ) = v = v where
v = inf
{
w ∈ C+(vˆ), w balanced} , v = sup{w ∈ C−(vˆ), w balanced} .
Proof: Consider first any balanced function w in C. One may identify w with its restriction
w∗ to the product of simplices P ∗ ×Q∗. I-concavity and II-convexity on ∆(K)×∆(L) of w
is equivalent to I-concavity and II-convexity of w∗ on P ∗ ×Q∗. We will prove that cavI(w)
is balanced and that (cavIw)
∗ = cavI(w∗).
Fix (p, q) in ∆(K) ×∆(L), and define p∗ = pB and q∗ = qB. Recall that cavIw(p, q) =
sup{∑Nm=1 αmw(pm, q) | N ≥ 1,∀m = 1, .., N, αm ≥ 0, ∑Nm=1 αm = 1, ∑Nm=1 αmpm = p}.
Given (αm, pm)m=1,..,N as above, for all m, w(pm, q) = w(pmB, q
∗), and
∑N
m=1 αmpmB = p
∗,
which implies
∑N
m=1 αmw(pm, q) ≤ cavI(w∗)(p∗, q∗), and therefore cavIw(p, q) ≤ cavI(w∗)(p∗, q∗).
Define now the affine map f from P ∗ to ∆(K) by:
∀p′ ∈ P ∗,∀r = 1, .., rM ,∀k ∈ K(r), f(p′)k =
{
(
∑
s∈K(r) p
′s) p
k
∑
s∈K(r) p
s if
∑
s∈K(r) p
s > 0
(
∑
s∈K(r) p
′s) p∗(r)k if
∑
s∈K(r) p
s = 0
.
We have f(p∗) = p. Moreover, for any recurrence class K(r), we have
∑
k∈K(r) f(p
′)k =∑
s∈K(r) p
′s. This implies that for all p′ ∈ P ∗, f(p′)B = p′. Consider now (αm, p∗m)m=1,..,N
such that ∀m = 1, ..., N, αm ≥ 0, p∗m ∈ P ∗,
∑N
m=1 αm = 1,
∑N
m=1 αmp
∗
m = p
∗. We have by
construction
∑N
m=1 αmf(p
∗
m) = p and w(p
∗
m, q
∗) = w(f(p∗m), q) which implies
N∑
m=1
αmw(p
∗
m, q
∗) =
N∑
m=1
αmw(f(p
∗
m), q) ≤ cavIw(p, q),
and therefore cavI(w
∗)(p∗, q∗) ≤ cavIw(p, q). We conclude that: ∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), cavIw(p, q) =
cavI(w
∗)(p∗, q∗). Consequently, cavI(w) is balanced and (cavIw)∗ = cavI(w∗).
The functions v and v are clearly balanced, and we will consider v∗ and v∗. Since vˆ is also
balanced, we deduce that:
v∗ = sup
{
w : P ∗ ×Q∗ −→ [−1, 1], w continuous II-convex and
∀(p∗, q∗) ∈ P ∗ ×Q∗, w(p∗, q∗) ≤ cavIMin(w, vˆ∗)(p∗, q∗)
}
,
and a similar property for v∗. The equality v∗ = v∗ follows from Theorem 2.1 in [16] and
implies v = v. Moreover, the function v∗ = v∗ is a solution of the Mertens-Zamir system on
P ∗ ×Q∗:
∀(p′, q′) ∈ P ∗ ×Q∗,
{
w(p′, q′) = vexIIMax(w, vˆ∗)(p′, q′)
w(p′, q′) = cavIMin(w, vˆ∗)(p′, q′)
,
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For (p, q) in ∆(K)×∆(L) and v = v = v , we have:
v(p, q) = v∗(p∗, q∗) = cavIMin(v∗, vˆ∗)(p∗, q∗)
= (cavIMin(v, vˆ))
∗ (p∗, q∗)
= cavIMin(v, vˆ)(p, q)
Finally, v is solution of the Mertens-Zamir system associated to vˆ. 2
Remark 6.2. The above proof relies heavily on the fact that B is associated to a recur-
rent Markov chain, that is no state is transient. Consider for example the case where:
K = {a, b, c}, and M =

1 0 00 1 0
1
2
1
4
1
4

 . The matrix B = limtM t would be here the follow-
ing: B =

1 0 00 1 0
2
3
1
3 0

 . In this case, the function f(p) = (pb − 1/3)+ (where + denotes the
positive part) is such that cavf(p0) = 0 and cav(f
∗)(p0B) = 2/9 for p0 = (0, 0, 1). This
was already pointed out in Renault [20], where general Markov matrices were considered. Our
reduction of the problem to the study of aperiodic recurrent Markov chains allows therefore
for useful technical simplifications. For example, in case L is reduced to a single point, our
characterization becomes v(p) = cav(vˆ)(p). Using aperiodic but possibly not recurrent Markov
chains, the characterization given in [20] reduces to v(p) = cav(vˆ)(pB) where vˆ and B are
defined similarly. One deduces from the above proof that these two expressions coincide for
recurrent Markov chains.
Remark 6.3. Note that one may add the condition that w is also I-concave in the supremum
defining v, because if w fulfills the required assumptions, then cavIw also and cavIw ≥ w. A
similar result holds for v.
We are now in a position to prove theorem 2.2, that is to show that limT vT exists and is
MZ(vˆ) = inf{w ∈ C+(vˆ)} = sup{w ∈ C−(vˆ)}. The proof is in the Appendix.
7 Open Questions
Note that the Lipschitz constant of 3 for the non revealing values is essentially used to obtain
the uniform convergence of the non revealing value functions vˆT . We do not know how to
prove this uniform convergence in a simpler way, neither if one can obtain a better Lipschitz
constant for the non revealing values.
The Maxmin of the infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides was
proved in [1] to be equal to cavIvexIIu. In the present model, it may be asked if the Maxmin
is equal to cavIvexII vˆ. One may hope to prove that Player 2 can defend this quantity by
combining the methods developed in the present work and the proof in [16]. It should be
more complex to determine what can be guaranteed by Player 1. Even if one proves that
Player 1 can guarantee the limit vˆ(p, q) in the non revealing game (and consequently that
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the non revealing game has a uniform value), this does not imply a priori that Player 1
can guarantee vexII vˆ in the original game. An other idea would be to consider the “semi-
revealing” game where only Player 1 is restricted to play a non revealing strategy, then to
prove that this semi-revealing game has a limit value v′(p, q) that can be guaranteed by Player
1, but then there is still little hope to be able to link cavIv
′ with vexII vˆ.
The results of Aumann and Maschler, and of Mertens and Zamir were extended to the
case of imperfect observation of the actions. In the same way, our model can be extended to
the case where instead of observing the past actions played, each player observes a stochastic
signal depending only on the past actions (state independent signalling). The notion of non-
revealing strategies still makes sense, so conceptually one may hope to use the same ideas to
prove the convergence of the value functions in this case. Note that a difficulty in this model
is that even if we fix the strategy of a player, say Player 1, this player is not able to compute
along the play the belief of Player 2 about the current state in K. And when introducing
signals, it is often the case that one has to construct strategies by blocks sufficiently long to
allow for statistical tests. How these blocks would interfer with the blocks where non revealing
strategies are used as in point (5) of the proof of Theorem 2.2 is unclear, and this seems a
highly technical problem.
In the Mertens Zamir setup, as well for splitting games, the existence of the limit value
has been extended to the case of general evaluations of the stream of payoffs ([3]), including
the discounted approach. It seems natural to hope for the same kind of generalization here,
however it is not clear how our proof could be extended to do so, and in particular to prove
the convergence of the discounted values to the same limit v.
An important extension of repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is
the case of general, possibly correlated, probabilities for the initial pair of states (k, l). The
results of Mertens and Zamir [16] were actually stated within this more general framework.
This suggests the following generalization of our model: we are given an initial probability
π ∈ ∆(K × L) and a Markov chain zt = (kt, lt) with values in K × L. At each stage, Player
1 observes kt and Player 2 observes lt. It is still possible to define the appropriate notion of
convex and concave hull as done by Mertens and Zamir. However, the definition of a non-
revealing strategy should be adapted. Indeed, even if Player 1 does not use his information
on the state, the beliefs of Player 2 on the recurrence classes of the chain zt may evolve. This
is left for future research.
Let us finally mention the recent work [4], where a model of Markov Games with incomplete
information is introduced, with transitions depending on a stage length parameter. The
asymptotic analysis is of different nature and leads to the existence of a continuous-time
limit value as the players play more and more frequently. This value is different of the long-
time limit value considered here and the study of possible relationships between these two
approaches is an interesting direction of research which is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 5.12
Let us begin with a few definitions. Recall that K is partitioned into recurrence classes
K(1), ..., K(rM ), each recurrent class r having a unique invariant measure p
∗(r) ∈ ∆(K(r)).
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P ∗ = conv{p∗(1), ..., p∗(M)} is the set of invariant measures forM , as well as for B = limtM t.
In the following we denote by ∆(rM ) the set of probabilities over the recurrence classes of M ,
i.e. over the finite set {1, ..., rM}.
Notation 8.1. Let p be in ∆(K). For each r, we denote by λ(p)r =
∑
k∈K(r) p
k the probability
of the recurrence class r under p. And we define the probability λ(p) ∈ ∆(rM ) by λ(p) =
(λ(p)r)r=1,...,rM . And for each r = 1, .., rM , we denote the conditional law, under p, of k given
r as the vector p|r ∈ ∆(K) such that:
pk|r =


pk
λ(p)r if λ(p)
r > 0 , k ∈ K(r),
p∗(r)k if λ(p)r = 0, k ∈ K(r),
0 if k /∈ K(r).
It follows that for all p ∈ ∆(K), p = ∑rMr=1 λ(p)rp|r. Since pk|r = 0 for k /∈ K(r), p|r will be
often assimilated to a vector in ∆(K(r)).
Definition 8.2. The map S : ∆(K)×∆(K)→ IR+ is defined by:
∀p, p′ ∈ ∆(K), S(p, p′) = ‖λ(p)− λ(p′)‖+
∑
r : λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r ‖p|r − p′|r‖.
The asymmetric map S will play an important role in the sequel, and will be used as a
(quasi, semi-) metric. S is clearly not a metric, but separates points (we have S(p, p′) = 0 if
and only if p = p′) and enjoys the following useful properties.
Lemma 8.3. For all p, p′ ∈ ∆(K),
‖p − p′‖ ≤ S(p, p′) ≤ 3‖p − p′‖, S(pM, p′M) ≤ S(p, p′),
S(pB, p′B) = ‖pB − p′B‖ = ‖λ(p)− λ(p′)‖, and S(p, p′) = ‖p− p′‖ if pB = p′B.
Before proving the lemma, we will present the roadmap of the proof.
Definition 8.4.
1) For α ∈ [0, 1], define the operator Φα on C by
Φα(f)(p, q) = max
x∈NR(p)
min
y∈NR(q)

α G(p, q, x, y) + (1− α) ∑
i∈I,j∈J
x(p)(i)y(q)(j)f(~p(x, i)M,~q(y, j)N)

 .
2) Let F be the subset of functions f in C satisfying:
• ∀p, p′ ∈ ∆(K), ∀q ∈ ∆(L), f(p, q)− f(p′, q) ≤ S(p, p′),
• ∀p ∈ ∆(K), ∀q, q′ ∈ ∆(L), f(p, q)− f(p, q′) ≤ S(q′, q),
• ∀p∗, q∗ ∈ P ∗ ×Q∗, f is I-concave and II-convex on B−1(p∗)× C−1(q∗).
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We now present our strategy for the proof of Proposition 5.12. We have vˆt+1 = Φ 1
t+1
(vˆt)
for t ≥ 0 (with the convention vˆ0 = 0), and all the functions in F are 3-Lipschitz using Lemma
8.3. As a consequence, to show that vˆt is 3-Lipschitz for each t, it is sufficient to show that
for all α, F is stable by Φα.
To do so, the main point is the following: given p and p′ in ∆(K) and x in NR(p), one
need to find x′ in NR(p′) such that (p′, x′) is not too far from (p, x). If p and p′ belong to
the same set B−1(p∗), i.e. if p and p′ assigns the same weight to each recurrence class, this
can be efficiently done using, within each simplex ∆(K(r)), a lemma by Laraki ([12] and [13],
see here the Appendix at the end). If pB 6= p′B, there exists a simple affine map to transfer
probabilities in B−1(pB) to probabilities in B−1(p′B) (Lemma 8.9). In the general case,
we need to combine both aspects, applying first the affine transformation then the Laraki
splitting (see Lemma 8.11). In the computations, the expression S(p, p′) appears and allows
to control the expressions.
After the proof of Lemma 8.3, all the rest of this section is devoted to the proof that:
∀α ∈ [0, 1], Φα(F) ⊂ F .
Proof of Lemma 8.3.
‖p− p′‖ =
∑
r :λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
∑
k∈K(r)
|λ(p)rpk|r − λ(p′)rp′k|r |
+
∑
r :λ(p)r=0 , λ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r +
∑
r : λ(p)r>0 , λ(p′)r=0
λ(p)r
≤
∑
r :λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
∑
k∈K(r)
(
|λ(p)rpk|r − λ(p′)rpk|r|+ |λ(p′)rpk|r − λ(p′)rp′k|r |
)
+
∑
r :λ(p)r=0 , λ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r +
∑
r :λ(p)r>0 , λ(p′)r=0
λ(p)r
=
rM∑
r=1
|λ(p)r − λ(p′)r|+
∑
r : λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r
∑
k∈K(r)
|pk|r − p′k|r | = S(p, p′).
On the other hand,
S(p, p′) = ‖λ(p) − λ(p′)‖+
∑
r : λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r‖p|r − p′|r‖
≤ ‖λ(p) − λ(p′)‖+
∑
r : λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
∑
k∈K(r)
(
|λ(p′)rpk|r − pk|+ |pk − p′k|
)
= ‖λ(p) − λ(p′)‖+
∑
r : λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0

|λ(p′)r − λ(p)r|+ ∑
k∈K(r)
|pk − p′k|


≤ 2‖λ(p) − λ(p′)‖+ ‖p − p′‖ ≤ 3‖p − p′‖.
For the next inequality, note that λ(pM) = λ(p) and (pM)|r = p|rM , so that using that
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p 7→ pM is non-expansive
S(pM, p′M) = ‖λ(p)− λ(p′)‖+
∑
r :λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)‖(p|r − p′|r)M‖
≤ ‖λ(p)− λ(p′)‖+
∑
r :λ(p)rλ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)‖(p|r − p′|r)‖ = S(p, p′).
Finally, the equalities are easily proved by direct computation. 2
Fix p in ∆(K) and q in ∆(L), and let p∗ = pB and q∗ = qC. To any x ∈ ∆(I)K , we
associate z ∈ ∆(K × I) defined by z(k, i) = pkxk(i), and will use a more abstract way to
denote non revealing strategies and conditional probabilities. Let ∆f (∆(K)) denote the set
of probabilities µ with finite support on ∆(K). Such a probability can be written as
µ =
N∑
n=1
αnδpn ,
with (αn, pn)n=1,..,N ∈ ([0, 1]×∆(K))N such that
∑N
n=1 αn = 1 and p =
∑
n=1,..,N αnpn. The
mean m(µ) is defined as
∫
∆(K) pdµ(p). This set is endowed with the usual weak
∗ topology
which is in particular metrized by the Wasserstein (Kantorovich-Rubinstein) distance induced
by the norm ‖.‖ and denoted dW . Recall the standard duality formula: ∀µ, ν ∈ ∆f (∆(K)),
dW (µ, ν) = max{
∫
φdµ−
∫
φdν | φ ∈ Lip1} = min{
∫
p,p′∈∆(K)
‖p−p′‖dπ(p, p′) | π ∈ P (µ, ν)},
where Lip1 denotes the set of 1-Lipschitz functions on ∆(K), and P (µ, ν) the set of probability
distributions on ∆(K) × ∆(K) having µ, ν for marginals. ∆f (∆(K)) is endowed with the
convex order ≤ defined by
µ ≤ ν ⇐⇒
∫
φdµ ≤
∫
φdν for all l.s.c. convex φ : ∆(K)→ IR ∪ {+∞}.
For instance, given p and p′ in ∆(K) the Dirac measure δ(p+p′)/2 is smaller than the average
1/2 δp + 1/2 δp′ . µ ≤ ν implies m(µ) = m(ν). And for all µ, ν with finite support U and V ,
then µ ≤ ν if and only if there exists F : U → ∆(V ) such that: ∀u ∈ U, ∑v∈V vF (u)(v) = u
and
∑
u∈U µ(u)F (u) = ν. This last condition (“martingale decomposition”) can be seen
as follows: µ is the law of some random variable X1 with values in ∆(K), ν is the law
of some random variable X2 with values in ∆(K), and we have the martingale condition:
IE(X2|X1) = X1 (see [2]).
Definition 8.5. Let Ψ : ∆(K × I)→ ∆f (∆(K)) be the disintegration mapping defined by
Ψ(z) =
∑
i∈I : z(i)>0
z(i)δ~p(z,i)
with z(i) =
∑
k∈K z(k, i) and ~p(z, i)
k = z(k,i)z(i) for i such that z(i) > 0.
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Imagine (k, i) is selected according to z and only i is observed, then for each i one can compute
the conditional ~p(z, i) on K. Ψ(z) gives the law of this posterior on K. It is standard that Ψ
is continuous and convex (see e.g. [21] Lemmas 4.16 and 4.17). Using the z variable and the
desintegration Ψ, the definition of NR(p) now reads as follows:
x ∈ NR(p) ⇐⇒ ∀k ∈ K,
∑
i∈I
z(k, i) = pk and Ψ(z) ∈ ∆f (B−1(p∗)),
⇐⇒ δp ≤ Ψ(z) and Ψ(z) ∈ ∆f (B−1(p∗)).
Definition 8.6. We define the set-valued maps:
H : ∆(K) ⇒ ∆f (∆(K))
p ∈ ∆(K) → H(p) = {µ ∈ ∆f (B−1(pB))| m(µ) = p},
R : ∆f (∆(K)) ⇒ ∆(K × I)
µ ∈ ∆f (∆(K)) → R(µ) = {z ∈ ∆(K × I) : Ψ(z) ≤ µ}.
We define similarly H : ∆(L)⇒ ∆f (∆(L)) and R : ∆f (∆(L)⇒ ∆(L× J) (keeping the same
letters H and R for simplicity). H(p) is the set of probabilities µ over B−1(pB) with mean p,
equivalently it is the set of probabilities µ over B−1(pB) such that δp ≤ µ. Hence H(p) is the
set of splittings at p such that all posterior keep the same weight on each recurrence class.
The set R(µ) can be seen the set of “strategies” z with disintegration no more informative
than µ. It is easy to show that:
∀µ ∈ H(p),∀z ∈ R(µ), Ψ(z) ∈ H(p).
For all α ∈ [0, 1] and f , Φα(f) can now be written as follows:
Φα(f)(p, q) = sup
z s.t.Ψ(z)∈H(p)
inf
w s.t.Ψ(w)∈H(q)
(
αG(z, w) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dΨ(z)⊗Ψ(w)(p˜, q˜)
)
= sup
µ∈H(p)
sup
z∈R(µ)
inf
ν∈H(q)
inf
w∈R(ν)
(
αG(z, w) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dΨ(z) ⊗Ψ(w)(p˜, q˜)
)
,
where G(z, w) =
∑
(k,l,i,j)∈K×L×I×J z(k, i)w(l, j)g(k, l, i, j).
We now simplify the above expression.
Proposition 8.7. Define V (µ, ν) = supz∈R(µ) infw∈R(ν)G(z, w). Then V is 1-Lipschitz for
dW and is I-concave and II-convex on ∆f (∆(K))×∆f (∆(L)). Moreover:
Φα(f)(p, q) = sup
µ∈H(p)
inf
ν∈H(q)
(
αV (µ, ν) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
)
.
Proof of Proposition 8.7: Using that f is II-convex on B−1(p∗)× C−1(q∗) and that C−1(q∗)
is invariant by N , we have for all w ∈ R(ν)∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dΨ(z)⊗Ψ(w)(p˜, q˜) ≤
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dΨ(z) ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜),
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which implies the following equality
infν∈H(q) infw∈R(ν)
(
αG(z, w) + (1− α) ∫∆(K)×∆(L) f(p˜M, q˜N)dΨ(z) ⊗Ψ(w)(p˜, q˜))
= infν∈H(q) infw∈R(ν)
(
αG(z, w) + (1− α) ∫∆(K)×∆(L) f(p˜M, q˜N)dΨ(z)⊗ ν(p˜, q˜))
since one can always choose ν = Ψ(w) in the right-hand side. A similar equality holds for Ψ(z)
and µ. This implies that for the moment we have proved that for all α ∈ [0, 1], f continuous
and (p, q) ∈ ∆(K),
Φα(f)(p, q) = sup
µ∈H(p)
sup
z∈R(µ)
inf
ν∈H(q)
inf
w∈R(ν)
(
αG(z, w) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
)
.
Let us now study the properties of the set-valued map R.
Claim 8.8. The set-valued map R : µ → R(µ) is non expansive from (∆f (∆(K)), dW ) to
(∆(K × I), ‖.‖). Moreover, for all β ∈ [0, 1], and µ, µ′ ∈ ∆f (∆(K)), we have βR(µ) + (1 −
β)R(µ′) ⊂ R(βµ + (1 − β)µ′). Similar properties hold for R : ν → R(ν) from ∆f (∆(L)) to
∆(L× J).
Proof of the claim: We first prove the non expansive property. Fix µ and µ′ ∈ ∆f (∆(K)),
and z ∈ R(µ), we have to find z′ in R(µ′) such that ‖z − z′‖ ≤ dW (µ, µ′). The idea is to link
Ψ(z) to µ via the martingale decomposition, then to link µ and µ′ via Kantorovich duality
formula, and finally to define z′ using both links.
Since Ψ(z) ≤ µ, there exists a map F : ∆(K) → ∆f (∆(K)) such that for all x ∈ ∆(K),
F (x) is centered in x and µ =
∑
i∈I z(i)F (~p(z, i)). Let U, V denote respectively the supports
of µ and µ′, and consider by Kantorovich duality a probability π on U × V with marginals
(µ, µ′) such that
∑
(u,v)∈U×V ‖u − v‖π(u, v) = dW (µ, µ′). For u ∈ U , let ~π(u) = (π(u,v)µ(u) )v∈V
denote the conditional law on V given u induced by π. Because the second marginal of π is
µ′, we have
∑
u∈U µ(u)~π(u) = µ
′. We define, for all i in I:
~p′(i) =
∑
v∈V
v m′(i)(v) ∈ ∆(K) with m′(i) =
∑
u∈U
F (~p(z, i))(u) ~π(u) ∈ ∆(V ),
and z′ ∈ ∆(K × I) by z′(k, i) = z(i) ~p′(i)k ∀k ∈ K,∀i ∈ I.
We have
∑
i∈I z(i)m
′(i) = µ′, and for each i the probability m′(i) is centered in ~p′(i). By
construction Ψ(z′) =
∑
i∈I z(i)δ~p′(i). Using the martingale decomposition, this implies that
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Ψ(z′) ≤ µ′. Using Jensen’s inequality, we have
‖z − z′‖ =
∑
i∈I
z(i)‖~p(z, i) − ~p′(i)‖
=
∑
i∈I
z(i)‖
∑
u∈U
uF (~p(z, i))(u) −
∑
(u,v)∈U×V
vF (~p(z, i))(u)~π(u)(v)‖
≤
∑
i∈I
z(i)
∑
u∈U
F (~p(z, i))(u)‖u −
∑
v∈V
v~π(u)(v)‖
≤
∑
i∈I
z(i)
∑
u∈U
F (~p(z, i))(u)
∑
v∈V
~π(u)(v)‖u − v‖
=
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈V
(
∑
i∈I
z(i)F (~p(z, i))(u))~π(u)(v)‖u − v‖
=
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈V
µ(u)~π(u)(v)‖u − v‖ = dW (µ, µ′)
The second assertion is due to the convexity of Ψ. This ends the proof of the claim, and we
now conclude the proof of Proposition 8.7.
The law µ being fixed, let us consider the map
(z, ν) ∈ R(µ)×H(q)→ inf
w∈R(ν)
(
αG(z, w) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
)
.
As an infimum of linear continuous functions, it is concave and upper semi-continuous with
respect to z on the compact convex set R(µ). On the other hand, the map
ν →
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
is linear and using the second point in the above claim, the map
(
ν → infw∈R(ν)G(z, w)
)
is
convex with respect to ν. It allows to apply Sion’s Minmax Theorem (see [24]) to conclude
that
Φα(f)(p, q) = sup
µ∈H(p)
inf
ν∈H(q)
sup
z∈R(µ)
inf
w∈R(ν)
(
αG(z, w) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
)
.
Using the claim about R and that z → G(z, w) is 1-Lipschitz, the function V is 1-Lipschitz for
dW . Moreover, using the same proof as above, V is I-concave and II-convex on ∆f (∆(K))×
∆f (∆(L)). The preceding expression becomes
Φα(f)(p, q) = sup
µ∈H(p)
inf
ν∈H(q)
(
αV (µ, ν) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
)
,
and this concludes the proof of Proposition 8.7. 2
It remains now to study the properties of the set-valued map H. Let us start with the
following lemma which proves a kind of “triangle equality” for the map S.
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Lemma 8.9. For any pair (p∗, p′∗) in P ∗, there exists an affine map L = Lp∗,p′∗ from B−1(p∗)
to B−1(p′∗) such that L(p∗) = p′∗, and for all (p, p′) ∈ B−1(p∗)×B−1(p′∗)
S(p, L(p)) = ‖L(p)− p‖ = ‖p∗ − p′∗‖ and S(p, L(p)) + S(L(p), p′) = S(p, p′).
Note that using matrices of example A section 4, the map L is just a homothetic trans-
formation as illustrated below.
c
a b
p
L(p) p'
P*
B-1(p*)
B-1(p'*)
p*
p'*
Proof: Note at first that B−1(p∗) = {p˜ ∈ ∆(K)|λ(p˜) = λ(p∗)}. Since p∗, p′∗ ∈ P ∗, we have
for all r = 1, .., rM , p
∗
|r = p
′∗
|r = p
∗(r). Define the map L by
L(p) =
rM∑
r=1
λ(p′∗)rp|r
It is easily seen that it defines an affine map with values in B−1(p′∗). Moreover,
‖L(p)− p‖ =
∑
r :λ(p∗)r>0
∑
k∈K(r)
|(λ(p
′∗)r
λ(p∗)r
− 1)|pk +
∑
r : λ(p)r=0
λ(p′∗)r
∑
k∈K(r)
p∗(r)k
=
∑
r :λ(p∗)r>0
|λ(p′∗)r − λ(p∗)r|+
∑
r :λ(p∗)r=0
λ(p′∗)r
=
rM∑
r=1
|λ(p′∗)r − λ(p∗)r| = ‖p∗ − p′∗‖ = S(p∗, p′∗).
For the last equality, note that by construction S(p, L(p)) = ‖λ(p′)− λ(p)‖ and S(L(p), p′) =∑
r : λ(p′)rλ(p)r>0 λ(p
′)‖p|r − p′|r‖, so that S(p, L(p)) + S(L(p), p′) = S(p, p′). 2
We now recall a lemma that will be used within each recurrence class.3
3The proof can be deduced from Lemma 8.2 in [12], which deals with general measurable spaces.
A simpler proof can be deduced from the version written in R. Laraki’s PhD thesis [13], proposition
5.12 page 107.
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Lemma 8.10. (Laraki [12]) K being a finite set, consider the simplex ∆(K) = {(pk)k∈K ∈
IRK+,
∑
k∈K p
k = 1} endowed with the L1-norm ‖p− p′‖ =∑k∈K |pk − p′k|. Consider a convex
combination p =
∑
s∈S λsps in ∆(K), with S finite, λs ≥ 0 and
∑
s∈S λs = 1. Then for every
p′ in ∆(K) there exists (p′s)s∈S in ∆(K)S such that:
p′ =
∑
s∈S
λsp
′
s and
∑
s∈S
λs‖ps − p′s‖ = ‖p− p′‖.
Using the lemmas 8.9 and 8.10, we now prove that H is “non expansive with respect to S”.
Lemma 8.11. For all p and p′ in ∆(K) and for all µ =
∑N
n=1 αnδpn ∈ H(p), there exists
ν =
∑N
n=1 αnδp′n ∈ H(p′) such that:
N∑
n=1
αnS(pn, p
′
n) = S(p, p
′).
In particular p→ H(pB) is 1-Lipschitz from (∆(K), ‖.‖) to (∆(∆(K)), dW ).
Proof: Let µ =
∑N
n=1 αnδpn ∈ H(p) and p′ ∈ ∆(K). Let us denote p∗ = pB and p′∗ = p′B.
Note that p|r =
∑N
n=1 αnpn|r since for all n = 1, .., N , λ(pn) = λ(p). Let L = Lp∗,p′∗ be
the affine map given by Lemma 8.9. Define p˜n = L(pn) for n = 1, .., N , so that L(p) =∑
n=1,..,N αnp˜n. From Lemma 8.9, for all p
′′ ∈ B−1(p′∗), we have S(pn, p′′) = S(pn, p˜n) +
S(p˜n, p
′′).
For r = 1, .., rM , using Lemma 8.10 in the simplex ∆(K(r)), there exists (br,n)n=1,..N ∈
∆(K(r)) such that
∑
n=1,..,N αnbr,n = p
′
|r and
∑
n=1,..,N αn‖p˜n|r−bn,r‖ = ‖
∑
n=1,..,N αnp˜n|r−
p′|r‖. If λ(p′)r > 0, then
∑
n=1,..,N αnp˜n|r =
∑
n=1,..,N αnpn|r = p|r.
Let p′n =
∑
r=1,..,rM
λ(p′)rbr,n, then
∑N
n=1 αnp
′
n = p
′ and
N∑
n=1
αnS(p˜n, p
′
n) =
N∑
n=1
αn
∑
r :λ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r‖p˜n|r − p′n|r‖
=
N∑
n=1
αn
∑
r :λ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r‖p˜n|r − br,n‖
=
∑
r :λ(p′)r>0
λ(p′)r‖p|r − p′|r‖ = S(L(p), p′).
It follows that
N∑
n=1
αnS(pn, p
′
n) =
N∑
n=1
αn(S(pn, p˜n) + S(p˜n, p
′
n)) = S(p, L(p)) + S(L(p), p
′) = S(p, p′).
2
We now conclude the general proof of Proposition 5.12. Let ε > 0, p′ ∈ ∆(K) and
µ∗ ∈ H(p) such that
inf
ν∈H(q)
(
αV (µ∗, ν) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ∗ ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
)
≥ Φα(f)(p, q)− ε.
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If µ∗ =
∑N
n=1 αnδpn , using Lemma 8.11, there exists µ
′ =
∑N
n=1 αnδp′n ∈ H(p′) such that∑N
n=1 αnS(pn, p
′
n) = S(p, p
′). Let ν∗ ∈ H(q) such that
αV (µ′, ν∗) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ′ ⊗ ν∗(p˜, q˜)
≤ inf
ν∈H(q)
(
αV (µ′, ν) + (1− α)
∫
∆(K)×∆(L)
f(p˜M, q˜N)dµ′ ⊗ ν(p˜, q˜)
)
+ ε ≤ Φα(f)(p′, q) + ε.
We have for all p, p′, f(pM, q) − f(p′M, q) ≤ S(pM, p′M) ≤ S(p, p′), and dW (µ∗, µ′) ≤∑
n αn‖pn − p′n‖ ≤
∑
N αnS(pn, p
′
n) = S(p, p
′). Consequently, we have
Φα(f)(p, q)− Φα(f)(p′, q) ≤ α(V (µ∗, ν∗)− V (µ′, ν∗)) + (1− α)
∫
f(p˜M, q˜N)d(µ∗ − µ′)⊗ ν∗(p˜, q˜) + 2ε
≤ αdW (µ∗, µ′) + (1− α)
∫
∆(L)
N∑
n=1
αn(f(pnM, q˜N)− f(p′nM, q˜N))dν∗(q˜) + 2ε
≤ αS(p, p′) + (1− α)
N∑
n=1
αnS(pn, p
′
n) + 2ε = S(p, p
′) + 2ε.
We conclude that Φα(f)(p, q)−Φα(f)(p′, q) ≤ S(p, p′). The symmetric property follows by the
same method. In order to conclude the proof, it remains to prove that Φα(f) is I-concave and
II-convex on B−1(p∗)× C−1(q∗), but this follows directly from the fact that for all β ∈ [0, 1]
and p, p′ ∈ ∆(K), βH(p) + (1 − β)H(p′) ⊂ H(βp + (1 − β)p′), and the similar property for
q, q′ ∈ ∆(L).
8.2 Proof of Theorem 2.2
The proof of our main theorem 2.2, making formal the description given in the end of
section 4 will use the two next lemmas.
Lemma 8.12. Let w ∈ C be such that ∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), w(p, q) ≤ cavIMin(w, vˆ)(p, q).
For all (p, q), there exists a convex combination (αm, pm)m=1,..,K in [0, 1] × ∆(K) such that∑K
m=1 αm = 1, p =
∑K
m=1 αmpm, ∀m = 1, ..,K, w(pm, q) ≤ vˆ(pm, q), and
∑K
m=1 αmw(pm, q) ≥
w(p, q).
The proof of lemma 8.12 is standard: there exists a convex combination p =
∑K
m=1 αmpm sat-
isfying
∑K
m=1 αmMin(w, vˆ)(pm, q) = cavIMin(w, vˆ)(p, q). This implies that for allm = 1, ..,K,
Min(w, vˆ)(pm, q) = cavIMin(w, vˆ)(pm, q) ≥ w(pm, q, so that w(pm, q) ≤ vˆ(pm, q). To conclude,
note that
∑K
m=1 αmw(pm, q) = cavIMin(w, vˆ)(p, q) ≥ w(p, q). 2
Lemma 8.13. Consider a convex combination p =
∑
s∈S αsps in ∆(K). Consider for each
s ∈ S a non revealing strategy σs in Σˆ(ps). There exists σ in Σ(p) such that:
∀q ∈ ∆(L),∀τ ∈ T , IPp,q,σ,τ =
∑
s∈S
αsIPps,q,σs,τ .
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As a consequence we have for all T ∈ IN∗, q in ∆(L) and τ ∈ T ,
IEp,q,σ,τ [
T−1∑
t=0
‖qˆt+1(q, τ)− qˆt(q, τ)‖] =
∑
s∈S
αsIEps,q,σs,τ [
T−1∑
t=0
‖qˆt+1(q, τ)− qˆt(q, τ)‖].
Moreover, for any function w ∈ C which is I-concave, II-convex and all t ≥ 1, we have
IEp,q,σ,τ [w(pˆt, qˆt)] ≥
∑
s∈S αsw(psB, qC).
Proof: Let us define σ as in Lemma 5.6 via the splitting procedure: observe the first state k1
in K, then choose a variable s in S according to the probability αsp
k1
s /p
k1 , and play according
to σs. It defines a probability IP on Ω×S and using Kuhn’s Theorem, there exists σ such that
the induced probability on Ω is equal to IPp,q,σ,τ . Moreover, for any event A in Ω, we have
IP (A|s) = IPps,q,σs,τ (A) almost surely, which implies the equality IPp,q,σ,τ =
∑
s∈S αsIPps,q,σs,τ .
Recall that whenever ht is compatible with (q, τ), qt(q, τ)(ht) does not depend on (p, σ).
Fix q and τ , for simplicity we write qt for qt(q, τ), qˆt for qˆt(q, τ) etc... Since qˆt = qtC, the
preceding equality implies that
IEp,q,σ,τ [
T−1∑
t=0
‖qˆt+1 − qˆt‖] =
∑
s∈S
αsIEps,q,σs,τ [
T−1∑
t=0
‖qˆt+1 − qˆt‖].
Let us now work with the probability IP . Since σs is non-revealing at ps, we have for all
stage t, s in S and history ht: (IP (kt+1 = k|ht, s))k∈KB = pt(ps, σs)(ht)B = psB. Denote by
IE the expectation under IP , and by s˜ the random variable with values in S of the first choice
of Player 1. The above implies:
IE[ps˜B|ht] = IE[(IP (kt+1 = k|ht, s˜))k∈K |ht]B = pt(p, σ)(ht)B = pˆt(p, σ)(ht).
Using that w is I-concave and Jensen’s inequality, we deduce that
IE[w(ps˜B, qˆt)|ht] ≤ IE[w(pˆt(p, σ), qˆt)|ht].
Using again that qˆt does not depend on (p, σ), we obtain
IE[w(ps˜B, qˆt)] = IE[IE[w(ps˜B, qˆt)|s˜]] =
∑
s∈S
αsIEps,q,σs,τ [w(psB, qˆt].
To conclude, w being II-convex, and by Jensen’s inequality again, we get:
∀s ∈ S, IEps,q,σs,τ [w(psB, qˆt] ≥ w(psB, qC).
2
Let us turn to the main proof of Theorem 2.2. It is divided into 6 parts.
(1) Fixing norms. Recall that if x = (xs)s∈S is an element of an euclidean space IRS , ‖x‖ =∑
s∈S |xs|. For T ∈ IN∗, the set of strategies ΣT is the set of maps from ∪T−1t=0 (K × I ×
J)t−1 × K to ∆(I) which is seen as a subset of IRI . ΣT can be seen as a compact subset
of (IRI)∪
T−1
t=0 (K×I×J)t−1×K endowed with the corresponding norm. Note at first that for all
T ∈ IN∗, for all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), and for all σ ∈ ΣT and τ, τ ′ ∈ TT ,
|γp,qT (σ, τ)− γp,qT (σ, τ ′)| ≤ ‖τ − τ ′‖.
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In the following points (2), (3), (4), the variables T ≥ 1 and ε ∈ (0, 1I ) are fixed.
(2) Here we show that we can approximate strategies with low variations of the martingales pˆt
and qˆt by non revealing strategies. Define Σ
ε
T as the set of strategies σ ∈ ΣT such that at any
stage and for any history of the game, all the pure actions in I are played with probability at
least ε.
Define the map F from ∆(K)×∆(L)× ΣT × TT to IR~T by
F (p, q, σ, τ) = (IPp,q,σ,τ (ht+1)(qˆt+1(q, τ)(ht+1)− qˆt(q, τ)(ht)))t=0,..,T−1 , ht+1∈(I×J)t+1 ,
where for ht+1 = (i1, j1, .., it, jt, it+1, jt+1), ht is defined here as (i1, j1, .., it−1, jt−1, it, jt), and
~T is the large but finite integer ~T = L
∑T−1
t=0 (I × J)t+1. Note that F is continuous and by
construction ‖F (p, q, σ, τ)‖ =∑T−1t=0 IEp,q,σ,τ [‖qˆt+1(q, τ)− qˆt(q, τ)‖].
Define the compact sets Rε = ∆(K) ×∆(L) × ΣεT × TT and Rˆε = F−1({0}) ∩ Rε, Rˆε is
the subset of Rε consisting of elements (p, q, σ, τ) such that τ is non-revealing at q.
Claim 8.14. For all δ > 0, there exists C1 = C1(T, ε, δ) such that
∀(p, q, σ, τ) ∈ Rε, ∃(pˆ, qˆ, σˆ, τˆ) ∈ Rˆε, ‖(p, q, σ, τ) − (pˆ, qˆ, σˆ, τˆ )‖ ≤ δ + C1‖F (p, q, σ, τ)‖.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that for all n ∈ IN∗, there exists (pn, qn, σn, τn) ∈ Rε such
that for all (pˆ, qˆ, σˆ, τˆ ) ∈ Rˆε, ‖(pn, qn, σn, τn) − (pˆ, qˆ, σˆ, τˆ )‖ > δ + n‖F (pn, qn, σn, τn)‖. By
compactness, we can extract a convergent subsequence with limit (p∗, q∗, σ∗, τ∗) such that
F (p∗, q∗, σ∗, τ∗) = 0 and ‖(p∗, q∗, σ∗, τ∗)− (pˆ, qˆ, σˆ, τˆ)‖ ≥ δ. which is a contradiction. 2
(3) Here we show that an optimal strategy of Player 1 in a non revealing game ΓˆT (p, q) is
good against strategies of Player 2 that are non revealing at q′, where q′ is close to q.
Claim 8.15. There exists C2 = C2(T, ε) such that for all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K) × ∆(L), for all
σ ∈ ΣˆT (p) which is optimal in ΓˆT (p, q), for all q′ ∈ ∆(L), and for all τ ′ ∈ Tˆ (q′),
γp,qT (σ, τ
′) ≥ −ε− C2‖q − q′‖+ vˆT (p, q).
Proof: Assume by contradiction that for all n ∈ IN∗, there exists (pn, qn) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), σn ∈
ΣˆT (pn) which is optimal in ΓˆT (pn, qn), q
′
n ∈ ∆(L), and τ ′n ∈ Tˆ (q′n) such that γpn,qnT (σn, τ ′n) ≤
−ε − n‖qn − q′n‖ + vˆT (pn, qn). By compactness, there exists a convergent subsequence with
limit (p∗, q∗, σ∗, q′∗, τ ′∗). Since the left hand-side of the above inequality is bounded below by
−1, we have q∗ = q′∗. Moreover, the non-revealing graph being closed, σ∗ is non-revealing at
p∗ and τ ′∗ is non-revealing at q∗. Using step (1), we have for all n,
vˆT (pn, qn)− ‖τ ′∗ − τ ′n‖ ≤ γpn,qnT (σn, τ ′∗)− ‖τ ′∗ − τ ′n‖ ≤ γpn,qnT (σn, τ ′n).
It follows that vˆT (p
∗, q∗) ≤ −ε+ vˆT (p∗, q∗), a contradiction. 2
(4) Here we control the error while perturbing an optimal strategy in Γˆ(p, q) by a non revealing
completely mixed strategy.
Let σ∗T denote the strategy in ΣT which plays an uniform distribution over I at all stages
independently of the history of the game, notice that σ∗T is non-revealing at all points in
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∆(K). For all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K) ×∆(L), let σT (p, q) denote an optimal strategy of Player 1 in
Γˆ(p, q). Denote by σT,ε(p, q) the strategy which plays: σ
∗
T with probability ε, and σT (p, q)
with probability 1−ε. The strategy σT,ε(p, q) is non revealing at p, and we have for all τ ∈ TT ,
IPp,q,σT,ε,τ = εIPp,q,σ∗T ,τ + (1 − ε)IPp,q,σT (p,q),τ . We choose δ > 0 such that δ(1 + C2(T, ε)) ≤ ε
and put C1 = C1(T, ε, δ). Using step (2), for all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), and all τ ∈ TT ,
∃(pˆ, qˆ, σˆ, τˆ) ∈ Rˆε, ‖(p, q, σT,ε(p, q), τ)− (pˆ, qˆ, σˆ, τˆ )‖ ≤ δ + C1‖F (p, q, σT,ε(p, q), τ)‖.
Using then (1) and (3),
γp,qT (σT,ε(p, q), τ) = εγ
p,q
T (σ
∗
T , τ) + (1− ε)γp,qT (σT (p, q), τ)
≥ −2ε− ‖τ − τˆ‖+ γp,qT (σT (p, q), τˆ )
≥ −2ε− ‖τ − τˆ‖ − ε− C2‖q − qˆ‖+ vˆT (p, q)
≥ vˆT (p, q)− 3ε− (1 + C2)(δ + C1‖F (p, q, σT,ε(p, q), τ‖)
≥ vˆT (p, q)− 4ε− (1 + C2)C1‖F (p, q, σT,ε(p, q), τ‖.
(5) Here we prove that: liminfT vT ≥ v.
Let w ∈ C be a balanced I-concave, II-convex function such that ∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K) ×
∆(L), w(p, q) ≤ cavIMin(w, vˆ)(p, q). Fix (p, q) ∈ ∆(K) × ∆(L), we have to show that
liminfT vT (p, q) ≥ w(p, q) (recall Remark 6.3 and Proposition 6.1 for the definition of v).
Fix ε ∈ (0, 1I ) and choose T0 ∈ IN∗ such that ‖vˆT0 − vˆ‖∞ ≤ ε. For simplicity, we will write
pt for pt(p, σ), qt for qt(q, τ) and define C1, C2 for C1(T0, ε, δ), C2(T0, ε) constructed in the
previous points (2), (3) and (4). Given N ∈ IN∗ and an optimal strategy τ ∈ T of Player 2
in ΓNT0(p, q), we define a strategy σ as follows.
The set of stages is divided into consecutive blocks of length T0. For n ≥ 0, at the
beginning of block n, i.e. at the beginning of stage nT0 + 1, Player 1 determines his strategy
for the block according to the random variables pnT0 and qnT0 . Two cases may occur.
If vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) ≥ w(pnT0 , qnT0), then σ play during the next T0 stages the non revealing
strategy σT0,ε(pnT0 , qnT0).
If vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) < w(pnT0 , qnT0), using Lemma 8.12, there exists a convex combination
pnT0 =
∑K
m=1 αn,mpn,m which depends on (pnT0 , qnT0), such that ∀m = 1, ..,K, w(pn,m, qnT0) ≤
vˆ(pn,m, qnT0) and
∑K
m=1 αn,mw(pn,m, qnT0) ≥ w(pnT0 , qnT0). In this case Player 1 plays at block
n the strategy σT0,ε(pnT0 , qnT0) ∈ ΣT0 given by Lemma 8.13 and such that for all τ ′ ∈ TT0 ,
IPpnT0 ,qnT0 ,σT0,ε(pnT0 ,qnT0),τ ′=
∑K
m=1 αn,mIPpn,m,qnT0 ,σT,ε(pn,m,qnT0 ),τ ′ . This ends the definition of
σ.
We have to show that the payoff γNT0(σ, τ) is large. It can be written as
γNT0(σ, τ) =
1
NT0
N−1∑
n=0
IEp,q,σ,τ [
(n+1)T0∑
t=nT0+1
IEp,q,σ,τ [g(kt, lt, it, jt)|hnT0 ]]
=
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
IEp,q,σ,τ [γ
pnT0 ,qnT0
T0
(σ(hnT0), τ(hnT0))]
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where τ(hnT0) ∈ TT0 and σ(hnT0) ∈ ΣT0 are the continuation strategies defined in Def. 5.13.
Claim 8.16. For all n = 0, .., N − 1 and hnT0 occurring with positive probability,
γ
pnT0 ,qnT0
T0
(σ(hnT0), τ(hnT0)) ≥ w(pnT0 , qnT0)− 4ε− (1 + C2)C1‖F (pnT0 , qnT0 , σ(hnT0), τ(hnT0)‖.
Proof: For the case vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) < w(pnT0 , qnT0), we have σ(hnT0) = σT0,ε(pnT0 , qnT0) and
γ
pnT0 ,qnT0
T0
(σT0,ε(pnT0 , qnT0), τ(hnT0)) =
K∑
m=1
αn,mγ
pnT0 ,qnT0
T0
(σT,ε(pn,m, qnT0), τ(hnT0))
≥
K∑
m=1
αn,mvˆT0(pn,m, qnT0)− 4ε− (1 + C2)C1
K∑
m=1
αn,m‖F (pn,m, qnT0 , σT,ε(pn,m, qnT0), τ(hnT0)‖
≥ w((pnT0 , qnT0)− 4ε − (1 + C2)C1‖F (pnT0 , qnT0 , σT,ε(pnT0 , qnT0)), τ(hnT0)‖,
where the last inequality follows from the Lemmas 8.12 and 8.13. The case vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) ≥
w(pnT0 , qnT0) is simpler. 2
Claim 8.17. ∀n = 1, .., N − 1, IEp,q,σ,τ [w(pnT0 , qnT0)] ≥ w(p, q).
Proof: By induction, it is sufficient to prove that for n = 0, .., N − 2,
IEp,q,σ,τ [w(p(n+1)T0 , q(n+1)T0)|hnT0 ] ≥ w(pnT0 , qnT0).
Let us at first consider the case vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) ≥ w(pnT0 , qnT0). Since σ(hnT0) is non-revealing
at pnT0 , we have p(n+1)T0 = pnT0 . Then, using that w is balanced, it is sufficient to prove that
IEp,q,σ,τ [w(pnT0B, q(n+1)T0C)|hnT0 ] ≥ w(pnT0B, qnT0C).
The process qˆt = qtC being a martingale, the above inequality follows from the fact that w is
II-convex and Jensen’s inequality. Let us now consider the case vˆ(pnT0 , qnT0) < w(pnT0 , qnT0).
Using Lemma 8.13, we have
IEp,q,σ,τ [w(p(n+1)T0B, q(n+1)T0C)|hnT0 ]
= IEpnT0 ,qnT0 ,σT,ε(pnT0 ,qnT0 ),τ(hnT0 )[w(pˆT0(pnT0 , σT,ε(pnT0 , qnT0)), qˆT0(qnT0 , τ(hnT0))]
≥
K∑
m=1
αn,mw(pn,mB, qnT0C) =
K∑
m=1
αn,mw(pn,m, qnT0) ≥ w(pnT0 , qnT0).
2
Summing up, we obtain:
γNT0(σ, τ) ≥ w(p, q)− 4ε− (1 + C2)C1
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
IEp,q,σ,τ [‖F (pnT0 , qnT0 , σ(hnT0), τ(hnT0))‖].
Finally, using Lemma 5.14, and the classical bound on the L1-variation of martingales (see
for instance Proposition 3.8. in [28]), we obtain:
N−1∑
n=0
IEp,q,σ,τ [‖F (pnT0 , qnT0 , σ(hnT0), τ(hnT0))‖] =
N−1∑
n=0
IEp,q,σ,τ [IEp,q,σ,τ [
(n+1)T0∑
t=nT0+1
‖qˆt − qˆt−1‖|hnT0 ]]
=
NT0∑
t=1
IEp,q,σ,τ [‖qˆt − qˆt−1‖] ≤
√
NT0(L− 1).
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We conclude that: γNT0(σ, τ) ≥ w(p, q) − 4ε − (1 + C2)C1
√
T0(L−1)√
N
. Since τ is optimal in
ΓNT0(p, q), we deduce that vNT0(p, q) ≥ w(p, q) − 4ε− (1 + C2)C1
√
T0(L−1)√
N
, and then
liminfNvNT0(p, q) ≥ w(p, q) − 4ε.
Using that ‖vT − vT+T ′‖∞ ≤ 2T ′T , this implies liminfT vT (p, q) ≥ w(p, q) − 4ε, and finally
liminfT vT (p, q) ≥ w(p, q). We deduce that liminfT vT (p, q) ≥ v.
(6) We conclude the proof of Theorem 2.2. Symmetrically, we obtain as in point (5) that
limsupT vT (p, q) ≤ v. The conclusion follows therefore from Proposition 6.1. 2
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